This chapter reconsiders developments in high politics in Germany in the period 1930-30 January 1933. It seeks in particular to review the manoeuvres that culminated in Hitler's appointment as chancellor in the light of the two approaches which have underpinned much research on the Weimar Republic in general in recent decades. On the one hand, the Fischerites and Bielefeld School had argued that the fundamental problem of the Weimar Republic lay in its want of modernity, in the many hangovers from imperial Germany which characterised it, and most of all in the continuing and structurally determined power of Germany's 'old elites' working together in a close 'alliance'. This perspective was anchored in the Sonderweg thesis, which, positing a 'Western' norm of modernisation, held Germany to have been an aberrant exception. Detlev Peukert challenged this approach at its roots. In a seminal study first published in 1987 under the title Die Weimarer Republik: Die Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne , 1 he here asserted that Weimar Germany, far from having missed some kind of alleged opportunity to modernise, represented a paradigmatic, indeed a 'classical' case, of modernity. An advanced capitalist economy, a welfare state that was even enshrined in the constitution, a large and growing service sector, bureaucracy and administrative systems, a shared belief in science and scientificity as a kind of cure-all -these are among the hallmarks of 'classical modernity' as he defined it. Mass participatory politics is another. Peukert argued that a crisis of classical modernity unleashed ' pathologies' whose virulent potential had always been embedded in The End of the Weimar Republic 231 modernity itself. Of the two aspects of a 'Janus-faced' 2 modernity, it was the grim visage, the 'dark side', 3 that thus came to dominate. Germany's 'old elites' cannot, therefore, be held solely or simply responsible for the advent of the Third Reich.
In one respect, Peukert's thesis sought to lead historians away from the death agony and toward the earlier and middle years of the Weimar Republic. In so doing, he sought to accomplish two goals. First, he wanted to encourage a view of the 1920s in Germany that would allow them to be understood in their own terms , not only as a kind of midrange prelude to Nazism. Second, he wanted to challenge one shibboleth of the historiographical left, arguing that the fundamental weaknesses of German democracy cannot be laid chiefly or straightforwardly at the door of a 'failed' or 'uncompleted' revolution of 1918-19. The 'failure' in question had been located precisely in the fact of the survival of the 'old elites' -with much of their old wealth and power still intact. Given that (rather oddly) big business was generally included in definitions of what constituted 'old' elites, Marxist and non-Marxist left-wing historians could find broad agreement that it was herein that key problems for the Weimar Republic were to be found. The 'German Revolution' had accomplished only surface changes: in society and the economy, deep continuities remained.
Peukert, however, pointed out that a 'less "unfinished" revolution would have had to battle against the same difficulties' 4 as those in fact encountered by the Weimar Republic. The social and economic problems Germany faced after the First World War are not explicable principally in relation to vestiges of an old order. Rather, they were essentially generic to the modern condition. In as much as they were especially acute in Germany, that is so because of the dangerously combustible admixture of unrealistic, utopian hopes invested in modernity on the one hand and, on the other, the inordinately burdensome legacy of the war, rendering any possibility of fulfilling those expectations infinitely remote. In consequence, Peukert argued, contests over the distribution of resources grew in scale and intensity through the 1920s, and room for manoeuvre in addressing them diminished. Thus, the broad direction of his argument seems clear. Even if the power of the army officer corps -and of the aristocracy within it -had been broken in 1918-19, even if the great estates east of the Elbe had been broken up, even if the upper echelons of the civil service had been somehow democratised, and even if cartels and the power of big business had been ended, there is no reason to suppose that the Depression would not have hit Germany in much the way that it in fact did or that
